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| 用 Firefox 来 Hacking Web 2.0程序 | 用 Firefox 来 Hacking Web 2.0 程序 | 
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| AJAX and interactive web services form the backbone of “web 2.0” applications. This  technological transformation brings about new challenges for security professionals. This article looks at some of the methods, tools and tricks to dissect web 2.0 applications (including Ajax) and discover security holes using Firefox and its plugins. The key learning objectives of this article are to understand the: * web 2.0 application architecture and its security concerns. * hacking challenges such as discovering hidden calls, crawling issues, and Ajax side logic discovery. * discovery of XHR calls with the Firebug tool. * simulation of browser event automation with the Chickenfoot plugin. * debugging of applications from a security standpoint, using the Firebug debugger. * methodical approach to vulnerability detection.  | 
AJAX and interactive web services form the backbone of “web 2.0” applications.  This technological transformation brings about new challenges for security professionals. This article looks at some of the methods, tools and tricks to dissect web 2.0 applications (including Ajax) and discover security holes using Firefox and its plugins. The key learning objectives of this article are to understand the: * web 2.0 application architecture and its security concerns. * hacking challenges such as discovering hidden calls, crawling issues, and Ajax side logic discovery. * discovery of XHR calls with the Firebug tool. * simulation of browser event automation with the Chickenfoot plugin. * debugging of applications from a security standpoint, using the Firebug debugger. * methodical approach to vulnerability detection.  | 
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| The newly coined term “web 2.0” refers to the next generation of web applications  that have logically evolved with the adoption of new technological vectors. XML-driven web services that are running on SOAP, XML-RPC and REST are empowering server-side components. New applications offer powerful end-user interfaces by utilizing Ajax and rich internet application (Flash) components. This technological shift has an impact on the overall architecture of web applications and the communication mechanism between client and server. At the same time, this shift has opened up new security concerns [ref1]_ and challenges. New worms such as Yamanner, Samy and Spaceflash are exploiting “client-side” AJAX frameworks, providing new avenues of attack and compromising confidential information.  | 
The newly coined term “web 2.0” refers to the next generation of web  applications that have logically evolved with the adoption of new technological vectors. XML-driven web services that are running on SOAP, XML-RPC and REST are empowering server-side components. New applications offer powerful end-user interfaces by utilizing Ajax and rich internet application (Flash) components. This technological shift has an impact on the overall architecture of web applications and the communication mechanism between client and server. At the same time, this shift has opened up new security concerns [ref1]_ and challenges. New worms such as Yamanner, Samy and Spaceflash are exploiting “client-side” AJAX frameworks, providing new avenues of attack and compromising confidential information.  | 
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| As shown in Figure 1, the browser processes on the left can be divided into the following layers: * **Presentation layer** - HTML/CSS provides the overall appearance to the application in the browser window. * **Logic & Process** - JavaScript running in the browser empowers applications to execute business and communication logic. AJAX-driven components reside in this layer.  | 
As shown in Figure 1, the browser processes on the left can be divided into the  following layers: * **Presentation layer** - HTML/CSS provides the overall appearance to the application in the browser window. * **Logic & Process** - JavaScript running in the browser empowers applications to execute business and communication logic. AJAX-driven components reside in this layer.  | 
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| * **Transport** - XMLHttpRequest (XHR) [ref2]_ . This object empowers asynchronous communication capabilities and XML exchange mechanism between client and server over HTTP(S). | *   **Transport** - XMLHttpRequest (XHR) [ref2]_ . This object empowers  asynchronous communication capabilities and XML exchange mechanism between client and server over HTTP(S).  | 
| Line 65: | Line 71: | 
| *   **The server-side components** on the right of Figure 1 that typically reside in the corporate infrastructure behind a firewall may include deployed web services along with traditional web application resources. An Ajax resource running on the browser can directly talk to XML-based web services and exchange information without refreshing the page. This entire communication is hidden from the end-user, in other words the end-user would not “feel” any redirects. The use of a “Refresh” and “Redirects” were an integral part of the first generation of web application logic. In the web 2.0 framework they are reduced substantially by implementing Ajax.  | 
*   **The server-side components** on the right of Figure 1 that typically  reside in the corporate infrastructure behind a firewall may include deployed web services along with traditional web application resources. An Ajax resource running on the browser can directly talk to XML-based web services and exchange information without refreshing the page. This entire communication is hidden from the end-user, in other words the end-user would not “feel” any redirects. The use of a “Refresh” and “Redirects” were an integral part of the first generation of web application logic. In the web 2.0 framework they are reduced substantially by implementing Ajax.  | 
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| In this asynchronous framework, the application does not have many *Refreshes* and  *Redirects*. As a result, many interesting server-side resources that can be exploited by an attacker are hidden. The following are three important challenges for security people trying to understand web 2.0 applications: 1. **Discovering hidden calls** - It is imperative that one identify XHR-driven calls generated by the loaded page in the browser. It uses JavaScript over HTTP(S) to make these calls to the backend servers. 2. **Crawling challenges** - Traditional crawler applications fail on two key fronts: one, to replicate browser behavior and two, to identify key server-side resources in the process. If a resource is accessed by an XHR object via JavaScript, then it is more than likely that the crawling application may not pick it up at all. 3. **Logic discovery** - Web applications today are loaded with JavaScript and it is difficult to isolate the logic for a particular event. Each HTML page may load three or four JavaScript resources from the server. Each of these files may have many functions, but the event may be using only a very small part of all these files for its execution logic. We need to investigate and identify the methodology and tools to overcome these hurdles during a web application assessment. For the purpose of this article, we will use Firefox as our browser and try to leverage some of its plugins to combat the above challenges.  | 
In this asynchronous framework, the application does not have many *Refreshes*  and *Redirects*. As a result, many interesting server-side resources that can be exploited by an attacker are hidden. The following are three important challenges for security people trying to understand web 2.0 applications: 1. **Discovering hidden calls** - It is imperative that one identify XHR-driven calls generated by the loaded page in the browser. It uses JavaScript over HTTP(S) to make these calls to the backend servers. 2. **Crawling challenges** - Traditional crawler applications fail on two key fronts: one, to replicate browser behavior and two, to identify key server-side resources in the process. If a resource is accessed by an XHR object via JavaScript, then it is more than likely that the crawling application may not pick it up at all. 3. **Logic discovery** - Web applications today are loaded with JavaScript and it is difficult to isolate the logic for a particular event. Each HTML page may load three or four JavaScript resources from the server. Each of these files may have many functions, but the event may be using only a very small part of all these files for its execution logic. We need to investigate and identify the methodology and tools to overcome these hurdles during a web application assessment. For the purpose of this article, we will use Firefox as our browser and try to leverage some of its plugins to combat the above challenges.  | 
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| Web 2.0 applications may load a single page from the server but may make several XHR  object calls when constructing the final page. These calls may pull content or JavaScript from the server asynchronously. In such a scenario, the challenge is to determine all XHR calls and resources pulled from the server. This is information that could help in identifying all possible resources and associated vulnerabilities. Let's start with a simple example. Suppose we can get today’s business news by visiting a simple news portal located at: http://example.com/news.aspx  | 
Web 2.0 applications may load a single page from the server but may make several  XHR object calls when constructing the final page. These calls may pull content or JavaScript from the server asynchronously. In such a scenario, the challenge is to determine all XHR calls and resources pulled from the server. This is information that could help in identifying all possible resources and associated vulnerabilities. Let's start with a simple example. Suppose we can get today’s business news by visiting a simple news portal located at: ``http://example.com/news.aspx``  | 
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| Being a web 2.0 application, Ajax calls are made to the server using an XHR object. We  can determine these calls by using a tool known as Firebug [ref3]_ . Firebug is a plug-in to the Firefox browser and has the ability to identify XHR object calls. Prior to browsing a page with the plugin, ensure the option to intercept XHR calls is selected, as shown in Figure 3.  | 
Being a web 2.0 application, Ajax calls are made to the server using an XHR  object. We can determine these calls by using a tool known as Firebug [ref3]_ . Firebug is a plug-in to the Firefox browser and has the ability to identify XHR object calls. Prior to browsing a page with the plugin, ensure the option to intercept XHR calls is selected, as shown in Figure 3.  | 
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| same page to discover all XHR object calls made by this particular page to the server.  This exchange is shown in Figure 4.  | 
same page to discover all XHR object calls made by this particular page to the  server. This exchange is shown in Figure 4.  | 
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| We can see several requests made by the browser using XHR. It has loaded the dojo  AJAX framework from the server while simultaneously making a call to a resource on the server to fetch news articles.  | 
We can see several requests made by the browser using XHR. It has loaded the  dojo AJAX framework from the server while simultaneously making a call to a resource on the server to fetch news articles.  | 
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| The preceding code makes an asynchronous call to the backend web  server and asks for the resource getnews.aspx?date=09262006. The content of this page is placed at the ‘result’ id location in the resulting HTML page. This is clearly an Ajax call using the XHR object. By analyzing the application in this format, we can identify vulnerable internal URLs, querystrings and POST requests as well. For example, again using the above case, the parameter “date” is vulnerable to an SQL injection attack.  | 
The preceding code makes an asynchronous call to the backend web server and asks  for the resource getnews.aspx?date=09262006. The content of this page is placed at the ‘result’ id location in the resulting HTML page. This is clearly an Ajax call using the XHR object. By analyzing the application in this format, we can identify vulnerable internal URLs, querystrings and POST requests as well. For example, again using the above case, the parameter “date” is vulnerable to an SQL injection attack.  | 
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| a web crawler. A web crawler crawls every single page and collects all HREFs (links).  But what if these HREFs point to a JavaScript function that makes Ajax calls using the XHR object? The web crawler may miss this information altogether. In many cases it becomes very difficult to simulate this environment. For example, here is a set of simple links::  | 
a web crawler. A web crawler crawls every single page and collects all HREFs  (links). But what if these HREFs point to a JavaScript function that makes Ajax calls using the XHR object? The web crawler may miss this information altogether. In many cases it becomes very difficult to simulate this environment. For example, here is a set of simple links::  | 
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| The “go1” link when clicked will execute the getMe() function. The code for getMe()  function is as shown below. Note that this function may be implemented in a completely separate file.  | 
The “go1” link when clicked will execute the getMe() function. The code for  getMe() function is as shown below. Note that this function may be implemented in a completely separate file.  | 
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| JavaScript-based APIs and extends the programmable interface to  the browser. By using the Chickenfoot plugin, you can write simple JavaScript to automate browser behavior. With this methodology, simple tasks such as crawling web pages can be automated with ease. For example, the following simple script will “click” all anchors with onClick events. The advantage of this plug-in over traditional web crawlers is distinct: each of these onClick events makes backend XHR-based AJAX calls which may be missed by crawlers because crawlers try to parse JavaScript and collect possible links but cannot replace actual onClick events.  | 
JavaScript-based APIs and extends the programmable interface to the browser. By using the Chickenfoot plugin, you can write simple JavaScript to automate browser behavior. With this methodology, simple tasks such as crawling web pages can be automated with ease. For example, the following simple script will “click” all anchors with onClick events. The advantage of this plug-in over traditional web crawlers is distinct: each of these onClick events makes backend XHR-based AJAX calls which may be missed by crawlers because crawlers try to parse JavaScript and collect possible links but cannot replace actual onClick events.  | 
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| This way, one can create JavaScript and assess AJAX-based applications  from within the Firefox browser. There are several API calls [ref5]_ that can be used in the chickenfoot plugin. A useful one is the “fetch” command to build a crawling utility.  | 
This way, one can create JavaScript and assess AJAX-based applications from  within the Firefox browser. There are several API calls [ref5]_ that can be used in the chickenfoot plugin. A useful one is the “fetch” command to build a crawling utility.  | 
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| To dissect client-side Ajax-based applications, one needs to go through  each of the events very carefully in order to determine process logic. One way of determining the entire logic is to walk through each line of code. Often, each of these event calls process just a few functions from specific files only. Hence, one needs to use a technique to step through the relevant code that gets executed in a browser. There are a few powerful debuggers for JavaScript that can be used to achieve the above objective. Firebug is one of them. Another one is venkman [ref6]_ . We shall use Firebug again in our example. Let’s take a simple example of a login process. The login.html page accepts a username and password from the end-user, as shown in Figure 6. Use the “inspect” feature of Firebug to determine the property of the form.  | 
To dissect client-side Ajax-based applications, one needs to go through each of  the events very carefully in order to determine process logic. One way of determining the entire logic is to walk through each line of code. Often, each of these event calls process just a few functions from specific files only. Hence, one needs to use a technique to step through the relevant code that gets executed in a browser. There are a few powerful debuggers for JavaScript that can be used to achieve the above objective. Firebug is one of them. Another one is venkman [ref6]_ . We shall use Firebug again in our example. Let’s take a simple example of a login process. The login.html page accepts a username and password from the end-user, as shown in Figure 6. Use the “inspect” feature of Firebug to determine the property of the form.  | 
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| After inspecting the form property, it is clear that a call is made to the “auth”  function. We can now go to the debugger feature of Firebug as illustrated in Figure 7 and isolate internal logic for a particular event.  | 
After inspecting the form property, it is clear that a call is made to the  “auth” function. We can now go to the debugger feature of Firebug as illustrated in Figure 7 and isolate internal logic for a particular event.  | 
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| All JavaScript dependencies of this particular page can be viewed. Calls  are made to the ajaxlib.js and validation.js scripts. These two scripts must have several functions. It can be deduced that the login process utilizes some of these functions. We can use a “breakpoint” to step through the entire application. Once a breakpoint is set, we can input credential information, click the “Submit” button and control the execution process. In our example, we have set a breakpoint in the “auth” function as shown in Figure 8.  | 
All JavaScript dependencies of this particular page can be viewed. Calls are  made to the ajaxlib.js and validation.js scripts. These two scripts must have several functions. It can be deduced that the login process utilizes some of these functions. We can use a “breakpoint” to step through the entire application. Once a breakpoint is set, we can input credential information, click the “Submit” button and control the execution process. In our example, we have set a breakpoint in the “auth” function as shown in Figure 8.  | 
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| We now step through the debugging process by clicking the “step in”  button, which was highlighted in Figure 8. JavaScript execution moves to another function, userval, residing in the file validation.js as shown in Figure 9.  | 
We now step through the debugging process by clicking the “step in” button,  which was highlighted in Figure 8. JavaScript execution moves to another function, userval, residing in the file validation.js as shown in Figure 9.  | 
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| The preceding screenshot shows the regular expression pattern used to  validate the username field. Once validation is done execution moves to another function callGetMethod as shown in Figure 10.  | 
The preceding screenshot shows the regular expression pattern used to validate  the username field. Once validation is done execution moves to another function *callGetMethod* as shown in Figure 10.  | 
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| backend web services as being made by the XHR object. This is shown in  Figure 11.  | 
backend web services as being made by the XHR object. This is shown in Figure 11. | 
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| The preceding resource is clearly some web services running under  the .NET framework. This entire dissection process has thrown up an interesting detail: we've found a user validation routine that can be bypassed very easily. It is a potential security threat to the web application. Taking our assessment further, we can now access the web service and its endpoints by using a WSDL file and directly bruteforce the service. We can launch several different injection attacks - SQL or XPATH - with tools such as wsChess [ref7]_ .  | 
The preceding resource is clearly some web services running under the .NET  framework. This entire dissection process has thrown up an interesting detail: we've found a user validation routine that can be bypassed very easily. It is a potential security threat to the web application. Taking our assessment further, we can now access the web service and its endpoints by using a WSDL file and directly bruteforce the service. We can launch several different injection attacks - SQL or XPATH - with tools such as wsChess [ref7]_ .  | 
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| The methodology for web services assessment overall is different and is  outside the scope of this article. However this walkthrough technique helps identify several client-side attacks such as XSS, DOM manipulation attacks, client-side security control bypassing, malicious Ajax code execution, and so on.  | 
The methodology for web services assessment overall is different and is outside  the scope of this article. However this walkthrough technique helps identify several client-side attacks such as XSS, DOM manipulation attacks, client-side security control bypassing, malicious Ajax code execution, and so on.  | 
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| Service-oriented architecture (SOA), Ajax, Rich Internet Applications (RIA)  and web services are critical components to next generation web applications. To keep pace with these technologies and combat next-generation application  | 
Service-oriented architecture (SOA), Ajax, Rich Internet Applications (RIA) and  web services are critical components to next generation web applications. To keep pace with these technologies and combat next-generation application  | 
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| web asset profiling and discovery, that in turn can help in identifying vulnerable  server-side resources. Next generation applications use JavaScript extensively. Smooth debugging tools are our knights in shining armor. The overall techniques covered in this article is a good starting point for web 2.0 assessments using Firefox.  | 
web asset profiling and discovery, that in turn can help in identifying  vulnerable server-side resources. Next generation applications use JavaScript extensively. Smooth debugging tools are our knights in shining armor. The overall techniques covered in this article is a good starting point for web 2.0 assessments using Firefox.  | 
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| Shreeraj Shah, BE, MSCS, MBA, is the founder of Net Square and leads Net Square’s  consulting, training and R&D activities. He previously worked with Foundstone, Chase Manhattan Bank and IBM. He is also the author of Hacking Web Services (Thomson) and co-author of Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense (Addison-Wesley). In addition, he has published several advisories, tools, and whitepapers, and has presented at numerous conferences including RSA, AusCERT, InfosecWorld (Misti), HackInTheBox, Blackhat, OSCON, Bellua, Syscan, etc. You can read his blog at http://shreeraj.blogspot.com/.  | 
Shreeraj Shah, BE, MSCS, MBA, is the founder of Net Square and leads Net  Square’s consulting, training and R&D activities. He previously worked with Foundstone, Chase Manhattan Bank and IBM. He is also the author of Hacking Web Services (Thomson) and co-author of Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense (Addison-Wesley). In addition, he has published several advisories, tools, and whitepapers, and has presented at numerous conferences including RSA, AusCERT, InfosecWorld (Misti), HackInTheBox, Blackhat, OSCON, Bellua, Syscan, etc. You can read his blog at http://shreeraj.blogspot.com/.  | 
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=====================================================
用 Firefox 来 Hacking Web 2.0 程序
=====================================================
:原文地址: `Security Focus <http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1879/1>`_
:摘录翻译: `惑者 <CliffPeng>`_
Introduction 
==============================
AJAX and interactive web services form the backbone of “web 2.0” applications. 
This technological transformation brings about new challenges for security 
professionals.
This article looks at some of the methods, tools and tricks to dissect web 2.0 
applications (including Ajax) and discover security holes using Firefox and its 
plugins. The key learning objectives of this article are to understand the:
*   web 2.0 application architecture and its security concerns.
*   hacking challenges such as discovering hidden calls, crawling issues, and 
    Ajax side logic discovery.
*   discovery of XHR calls with the Firebug tool.
*   simulation of browser event automation with the Chickenfoot plugin.
*   debugging of applications from a security standpoint, using the Firebug 
    debugger.
*   methodical approach to vulnerability detection.
Web 2.0 application overview
=================================
The newly coined term “web 2.0” refers to the next generation of web 
applications that have logically evolved with the adoption of new technological 
vectors. XML-driven web services that are running on SOAP, XML-RPC and REST are 
empowering server-side components. New applications offer powerful end-user 
interfaces by utilizing Ajax and rich internet application (Flash) components.
This technological shift has an impact on the overall architecture of web 
applications and the communication mechanism between client and server. At the 
same time, this shift has opened up new security concerns [ref1]_ and challenges.
New worms such as Yamanner, Samy and Spaceflash are exploiting “client-side” 
AJAX frameworks, providing new avenues of attack and compromising confidential 
information.
.. image:: 1.jpg
**Figure 1. Web 2.0 architecture layout.**
As shown in Figure 1, the browser processes on the left can be divided into the 
following layers:
*   **Presentation layer** - HTML/CSS provides the overall appearance to the 
    application in the browser window.
*   **Logic & Process** - JavaScript running in the browser empowers 
    applications to execute business and communication logic. AJAX-driven 
    components reside in this layer.
    
*   **Transport** - XMLHttpRequest (XHR) [ref2]_ . This object empowers 
    asynchronous communication capabilities and XML exchange mechanism between 
    client and server over HTTP(S).
    
*   **The server-side components** on the right of Figure 1 that typically 
    reside in the corporate infrastructure behind a firewall may include 
    deployed web services along with traditional web application resources. 
    An Ajax resource running on the browser can directly talk to XML-based web 
    services and exchange information without refreshing the page. This entire 
    communication is hidden from the end-user, in other words the end-user would 
    not “feel” any redirects. The use of a “Refresh” and “Redirects” were 
    an integral part of the first generation of web application logic. In the 
    web 2.0 framework they are reduced substantially by implementing Ajax.
    
Web 2.0 assessment challenges
=====================================================
In this asynchronous framework, the application does not have many *Refreshes* 
and *Redirects*. As a result, many interesting server-side resources that can be 
exploited by an attacker are hidden. The following are three important 
challenges for security people trying to understand web 2.0 applications:
1.  **Discovering hidden calls** - It is imperative that one identify 
XHR-driven calls generated by the loaded page in the browser. It uses JavaScript
over HTTP(S) to make these calls to the backend servers.
2.  **Crawling challenges** - Traditional crawler applications fail on two 
key fronts: one, to replicate browser behavior and two, to identify key 
server-side resources in the process. If a resource is accessed by an XHR object 
via JavaScript, then it is more than likely that the crawling application may 
not pick it up at all.
3.  **Logic discovery** - Web applications today are loaded with JavaScript 
and it is difficult to isolate the logic for a particular event. Each HTML page 
may load three or four JavaScript resources from the server. Each of these files 
may have many functions, but the event may be using only a very small part of 
all these files for its execution logic.
We need to investigate and identify the methodology and tools to overcome these 
hurdles during a web application assessment. For the purpose of this article, we 
will use Firefox as our browser and try to leverage some of its plugins to 
combat the above challenges.
Discovering hidden calls
===============================================
Web 2.0 applications may load a single page from the server but may make several 
XHR object calls when constructing the final page. These calls may pull content 
or JavaScript from the server asynchronously. In such a scenario, the challenge 
is to determine all XHR calls and resources pulled from the server. This is 
information that could help in identifying all possible resources and associated 
vulnerabilities. Let's start with a simple example.
Suppose we can get today’s business news by visiting a simple news portal 
located at: ``http://example.com/news.aspx``
The page in the browser would resemble the screenshot illustrated below in Figure 2.
.. image:: 2.jpg
Being a web 2.0 application, Ajax calls are made to the server using an XHR 
object. We can determine these calls by using a tool known as Firebug [ref3]_ . 
Firebug is a plug-in to the Firefox browser and has the ability to identify XHR 
object calls.
Prior to browsing a page with the plugin, ensure the option to intercept XHR 
calls is selected, as shown in Figure 3.
.. image:: 3.jpg
With the Firebug option to intercept XMLHttpRequest calls enabled, we browse the 
same page to discover all XHR object calls made by this particular page to the 
server. This exchange is shown in Figure 4.
.. image:: 4.jpg
**Figure 4. Capturing Ajax calls.**
We can see several requests made by the browser using XHR. It has loaded the 
dojo AJAX framework from the server while simultaneously making a call to a 
resource on the server to fetch news articles.
http://example.com/getnews.aspx?date=09262006
If we closely look at the code, we can see following function in JavaScript::
 function getNews()
 {
   var http;
   http = new XMLHttpRequest();
   http.open("GET", " getnews.aspx?date=09262006", true);
   http.onreadystatechange = function()
   {
     if (http.readyState == 4) {
      var response = http.responseText;
      document.getElementById('result').innerHTML = response;
       }  
   }
   http.send(null);
 }
The preceding code makes an asynchronous call to the backend web server and asks 
for the resource getnews.aspx?date=09262006. The content of this page is placed 
at the ‘result’ id location in the resulting HTML page. This is clearly an 
Ajax call using the XHR object.
By analyzing the application in this format, we can identify vulnerable internal 
URLs, querystrings and POST requests as well. For example, again using the above 
case, the parameter “date” is vulnerable to an SQL injection attack.
Crawling challenges and browser simulation
===========================================================
An important reconnaissance tool when performing web application assessment is 
a web crawler. A web crawler crawls every single page and collects all HREFs 
(links). But what if these HREFs point to a JavaScript function that makes Ajax 
calls using the XHR object? The web crawler may miss this information altogether.
In many cases it becomes very difficult to simulate this environment. For 
example, here is a set of simple links::
 <a href="#" onclick="getMe(); return false;">go1</a><br>
 <a href="/hi.html">go2</a><br>
 <a href="#" onclick="getMe(); return false;">go3</a><br>
The “go1” link when clicked will execute the getMe() function. The code for 
getMe() function is as shown below. Note that this function may be implemented 
in a completely separate file.
::
    function getMe()
    {
      var http;
      http = new XMLHttpRequest();
      http.open("GET", "hi.html", true);
      http.onreadystatechange = function()
      {
       if (http.readyState == 4) {
         var response = http.responseText;
         document.getElementById('result').innerHTML = response;
       }  
       }
      http.send(null);
    }
The preceding code makes a simple Ajax call to the hi.html resource on the 
server.
Is it possible to simulate this click using automation? Yes! Here is one 
approach using the Firefox plug-in Chickenfoot [ref4]_ that provides 
JavaScript-based APIs and extends the programmable interface to the browser.
By using the Chickenfoot plugin, you can write simple JavaScript to automate 
browser behavior. With this methodology, simple tasks such as crawling web pages 
can be automated with ease. For example, the following simple script will 
“click” all anchors with onClick events. The advantage of this plug-in over 
traditional web crawlers is distinct: each of these onClick events makes backend 
XHR-based AJAX calls which may be missed by crawlers because crawlers try to 
parse JavaScript and collect possible links but cannot replace actual onClick 
events.
::
    l=find('link')
    for(i=0;i<l.count;i++){     
    a = document.links[i];
    test = a.onclick;
    if(!(test== null)){
        var e = document.createEvent('MouseEvents');
        e.initMouseEvent('click',true,true,document.defaultView,1,0,0,0,
                                0,false,false,false,false,0,null);
        a.dispatchEvent(e);     
        }
    }
    
You can load this script in the Chickenfoot console and run it as shown in 
Figure 5.
.. image:: 5.jpg
**Figure 5. Simulating onClick AJAX call with chickenfoot.**
This way, one can create JavaScript and assess AJAX-based applications from 
within the Firefox browser. There are several API calls [ref5]_ that can be used 
in the chickenfoot plugin. A useful one is the “fetch” command to build a 
crawling utility.
Logic discovery & dissecting applications
==================================================
To dissect client-side Ajax-based applications, one needs to go through each of 
the events very carefully in order to determine process logic. One way of 
determining the entire logic is to walk through each line of code. Often, each 
of these event calls process just a few functions from specific files only. 
Hence, one needs to use a technique to step through the relevant code that gets 
executed in a browser.
There are a few powerful debuggers for JavaScript that can be used to achieve 
the above objective. Firebug is one of them. Another one is venkman [ref6]_ . We 
shall use Firebug again in our example.
Let’s take a simple example of a login process. The login.html page accepts a 
username and password from the end-user, as shown in Figure 6. Use the 
“inspect” feature of Firebug to determine the property of the form.
.. image:: 6.jpg
**Figure 6. Form property inspection with Firebug.**
After inspecting the form property, it is clear that a call is made to the 
“auth” function. We can now go to the debugger feature of Firebug as 
illustrated in Figure 7 and isolate internal logic for a particular event.
.. image:: 7.jpg
**Figure 7. Debugging with Firebug.**
All JavaScript dependencies of this particular page can be viewed. Calls are 
made to the ajaxlib.js and validation.js scripts. These two scripts must have 
several functions. It can be deduced that the login process utilizes some of 
these functions. We can use a “breakpoint” to step through the entire 
application. Once a breakpoint is set, we can input credential information, 
click the “Submit” button and control the execution process. In our example, 
we have set a breakpoint in the “auth” function as shown in Figure 8.
.. image:: 8.jpg
**Figure 8. Setting a breakpoint and controlling execution process.**
We now step through the debugging process by clicking the “step in” button, 
which was highlighted in Figure 8. JavaScript execution moves to another 
function, userval, residing in the file validation.js as shown in Figure 9.
.. image:: 9.jpg
**Figure 9. Moving to validation.js script page.**
The preceding screenshot shows the regular expression pattern used to validate 
the username field. Once validation is done execution moves to another function 
*callGetMethod* as shown in Figure 10.
.. image:: 10.jpg
Finally, at the end of the execution sequence, we can observe the call to 
backend web services as being made by the XHR object. This is shown in Figure 11.
.. image:: 11.jpg
**Figure 11. Web services call on the Firebug console.**
Here we have identified the resource location for the backend web services ::
    http://example.com/2/auth/ws/login.asmx/getSecurityToken?username=amish&password=amish
The preceding resource is clearly some web services running under the .NET 
framework. This entire dissection process has thrown up an interesting detail: 
we've found a user validation routine that can be bypassed very easily. It is a 
potential security threat to the web application.
Taking our assessment further, we can now access the web service and its 
endpoints by using a WSDL file and directly bruteforce the service. We can 
launch several different injection attacks - SQL or XPATH - with tools such as 
wsChess [ref7]_ .
In this particular case, the application is vulnerable to an XPATH injection. 
The methodology for web services assessment overall is different and is outside 
the scope of this article. However this walkthrough technique helps identify 
several client-side attacks such as XSS, DOM manipulation attacks, client-side 
security control bypassing, malicious Ajax code execution, and so on.
Conclusion
=======================
Service-oriented architecture (SOA), Ajax, Rich Internet Applications (RIA) and 
web services are critical components to next generation web applications. To 
keep pace with these technologies and combat next-generation application 
security challenges, one needs to design and develop different methodologies 
and tools. One of the efficient methodologies of assessing applications is by 
effectively using a browser.
In this article we have seen three techniques to assess web 2.0 applications. 
By using these methodologies it is possible to identify and isolate several 
Ajax-related vulnerabilities. Browser automation scripting can assist us in 
web asset profiling and discovery, that in turn can help in identifying 
vulnerable server-side resources.
Next generation applications use JavaScript extensively. Smooth debugging tools 
are our knights in shining armor. The overall techniques covered in this article 
is a good starting point for web 2.0 assessments using Firefox.
About the author
========================
Shreeraj Shah, BE, MSCS, MBA, is the founder of Net Square and leads Net 
Square’s consulting, training and R&D activities. He previously worked with 
Foundstone, Chase Manhattan Bank and IBM. He is also the author of Hacking Web 
Services (Thomson) and co-author of Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense 
(Addison-Wesley). In addition, he has published several advisories, tools, and 
whitepapers, and has presented at numerous conferences including RSA, AusCERT, 
InfosecWorld (Misti), HackInTheBox, Blackhat, OSCON, Bellua, Syscan, etc. You 
can read his blog at http://shreeraj.blogspot.com/.
References
========================
.. [ref1] `Ajax security <http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1868>`_
.. [ref2] `XHR Object specification <http://www.w3.org/TR/XMLHttpRequest/>`_
.. [ref3] `Firebug download <https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/1843/>`_ ; 
   `Firebug usage <http://www.joehewitt.com/software/firebug/docs.php>`_
.. [ref4] `Chickenfoot quick start <http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/chickenfoot/quickstart.html>`_
.. [ref5] `Chickenfoot API reference <http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/chickenfoot/api.html>`_
.. [ref6] `Venkman walkthrough <http://www.mozilla.org/projects/venkman/venkman-walkthrough.html>`_
.. [ref7] `wsChess <http://net-square.com/wschess>`_